Development & Dispossession

The Crisis of Forced Displacement and Resettlement

Edited by Anthony Oliver-Smith

School for Advanced Research Press
Santa Fe 2009
Routine and Dissonant Cultures

A Theory about the Psycho-socio-cultural Disruptions of Involuntary Displacement and Ways to Mitigate Them without Inflicting Even More Damage

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Modest advances have been made to avoid or mitigate the economic impoverishment that threatens involuntarily displaced peoples (Cernea, ed. 1999; Mejía 1999; Scudder 2005a). Less attention has been paid to the noneconomic, psycho-socio-cultural (PSC) impoverishment inflicted by involuntary displacement (Barabas and Bartolomé 1992; Cernea 2000a; de Wet 2006; Downing 1996a; Oliver-Smith 1986; Tamondong-Helin 1996). Mitigation of the economic damages has focused on restoring losses, recovering livelihoods, and—in rare instances—sharing project benefits with those displaced (Cernea 2007 and chapter 3, this volume; Downing 2002a). In contrast, mitigation of PSC damages has proven much more problematic. Few infrastructure projects consider or attempt to mitigate this risk.

Those who may benefit from these infrastructure projects avoid this untidy issue by embracing five, if not more, fallacies that conveniently block further discussions and actions, offering those who should bear responsibility a rationale, though untenable, for shirking it.

First, the compensation-is-enough fallacy holds that all moral and economic obligations to displaced peoples are met by compensation payments. Second, the strict-compliance fallacy holds that resettlement risks have been addressed when a project adheres to applicable planning, policies, and laws. Third, the blame-the-victims fallacy holds that displacees’
psycho-socio-cultural problems are a consequence of their failure to take advantage of opportunities offered them. Fourth, the-clock-stops-with-construction fallacy is that external responsibilities to displaced persons end at the completion of the Resettlement Action Plan (RAP) or with termination of the construction phase of the project. And fifth, the someone-else-should-pay fallacy holds that the project designers, governments, and financiers are neither legally nor economically liable for psycho-socio-cultural changes.

This chapter reframes the psycho-socio-cultural dimension, arguing that involuntary displacement transforms routine culture into dissonant culture, which then transforms into a different routine culture. In the psycho-socio-cultural realm, it is highly improbable that a pre-displacement routine culture will be recovered, let alone restored. Although irreversible, there are ways to mitigate PSC impoverishment. Relative success, we shall argue, is determined by how well the post-displacement routine culture is able to address fundamental questions of the displaced, compared with the pre-displacement culture. If involuntary resettlement cannot be avoided, the applied question then becomes, what can be done to facilitate the reestablishment of a new routine culture so that it adequately addresses the primary cultural questions faced by the displaced peoples? We will highlight actions that might be taken to minimize PSC impoverishment and to strengthen the social and cultural capacity of displaced peoples.

IMPOVERISHMENT RISKS

Despite strong resistance and opposition to development-induced displacement, millions of people each year are unexpectedly uprooted by war, natural disasters, and infrastructure developments (Oliver-Smith 1991; Russell 2002). These events unleash widespread and, in many ways, similar psycho-socio-cultural, economic, and political changes. Chief among these is the resettlement effect, which is defined as the “loss of physical and non-physical assets, including homes, communities, productive land, income-earning assets and sources, subsistence, resources, cultural sites, social structures, networks and ties, cultural identity and mutual help mechanisms” (Asian Development Bank 1998:vi). Failure to mitigate the resettlement effect may generate “new poverty,” as opposed to the “old poverty” before displacement (Cernea 2000a, 2002; Downing 2002a, 2002b; Scudder 2005a).

For more than half a century, a global struggle has been waged to discover what interventions might reduce the suffering of the displaced—unfortunate victims of other people’s progress—and the likelihood of the resettlement effect (see Guggenheim 1994 for an annotated bibliography
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until 1993; Shami 1993). Professionals, academics, nongovernmental (NGO) and human rights activists, and a few social scientists working for key international financial institutions have shown that negative consequences of involuntary displacement extend far beyond the loss of land. They seek ways to prevent impoverishment and to reconstruct and improve the livelihoods of displacees. Despite their small numbers, their efforts have encouraged most of the international financial intermediaries (IFIs) in establishing involuntary resettlement guidelines, also known as safeguard policies (several national governments—notably, China and India—have set national policies), and have promoted research within the social sciences, including economics. More than four hundred professionals working on involuntary displacement and resettlement formed the International Network on Displacement and Resettlement in 2000. Since 2002, it has maintained a website at http://www.displacement.net and publishes an online quarterly newsletter, edited by Hari M. Mathur in India.

Risk is the possibility that a course of social action will trigger adverse effects such as loss, destruction, and deprivation for future generations (Cernea 2000a). The majority of professionals working on involuntary displacement and resettlement have focused on multidimensional impoverishment risks (homelessness, food insecurity, increased morbidity, landlessness, loss of employment, loss of access to common resources, marginalization, loss of human rights, and social disarticulation) (Cernea, ed. 1999, 2000a, 2002; Downing 2002a; Johnston and Garcia-Downing 2004; Kedia 2003; Scudder 2005a).

Routine Culture and Primary Questions

The psycho-socio-cultural risks have been the most neglected, the most difficult to study, and the least likely to be mitigated (Cernea 2000a; Downing 1996a; Scudder 2005a; Wallace 1957). A new social poverty can be seen everywhere—in lives wrecked, social relationships realigned, social and economic assets lost, leaders toppled, people (particularly the elderly) growing ill and dying prematurely, and the diminished capacity of a society to withstand non-project-related threats (Behura and Nayak 1993; Cernea 1990, 1994, 2002, 2005a; de Wet 2006; Downing 1996a, 2002a, 2002b; Oliver-Smith 1986). A list of such impacts, however informative, does not reveal the underlying dynamics so that mitigation can be effectuated. Why are social relations realigned in one way rather than in another? Why are particular assets selected or created to replace lost assets?

An understanding of what happens when people are involuntarily displaced begins with culture. Culture is a set of constructs and rules for
constructing the world, interpreting it, and adapting to it (Bock 1968; Csikszentmihalyi and Rochberg-Halton 1981; Fabian 1992; Frake 1993; Selby and Garrettson 1981). The constructs and rules answer what we like to call "primary questions": Who are we? Where are we? Where are we coming from? Where are we going? Why do people live and die? What are our responsibilities to others and to ourselves? Most likely, there are more, but these cover a lot of ground.

The answers to the primary questions vary from culture to culture and within cultures. The constructs are codified in language, symbols, places endowed with meaning, kinship categories, ritual, dance, music, humor, public works, access rights to certain areas and resources, titles and job descriptions, and other socio-cultural expressions (Downing 1996a; Hirsch 1999; Lightfoot 1979; Low 1992; Pellow 1994; Riley 1994; Sutro and Downing 1988). For the most part, life is humdrum—or, to say this in another way, patterned. Day after day, individuals make tactical decisions as they navigate routine culture. People repair broken doors, meet friends, mend fences, collect firewood, and go from one place to another. Culture defines how they gain access to restricted places and situations by performing routine events such as attending school, paying admission, or working for income. These are tactical adjustments to life. Kin groups and institutions—schools, businesses, governments, and other organizations—also address primary questions and, collectively, navigate and construct routine culture (Douglas 1973). These groups and their leaders continually grapple, usually in tightly patterned fashion, with recurring questions and tactical issues such as recruitment, retirement, rewards, budget cycles, goals, arranging meetings, making announcements, opening and closing facilities, or planning an event in their annual cycle.

Routine culture is defined by roughly the same people, or groups, repeatedly reoccupying the same places at the same times. Negotiation is the most common way that individuals and institutions work out what is and what is not an acceptable construction of space, time, and personages. Life becomes simultaneously interesting and exasperating as people continually define and redefine their surroundings and their perceived place in those surroundings. And the PSC constructions take on value (de Pina Cabal 1994) as individuals and groups judge certain constructs to be more desirable or undesirable than others.

Life may be humdrum, but it is not static. Not everyone understands, agrees with, or accepts his or her place within the constructs, nor the constructs themselves. Institutions, individuals, and families redefine their constructed spaces, their times, and their personages. We move things
around, reschedule events, make new friends, change jobs, and so on. Negotiations never end.

Occasionally, negotiated relations are more radically realigned by birth, death, divorce, or marriage. From a societal perspective, these unavoidable demographic changes cause regular micro-disruptions that force individuals and institutions to rearrange their routines (Behura and Nayak 1993; Lightfoot 1979). Field anthropologists take great interest in discovering the meanings associated with a new cultural landscape that may, at first glance, be devoid of recognizable meaning. Early anthropology focused on these micro-disturbances, adjustments that cultures made to changes brought about by birth, initiation, maturation, and death and its spatial-temporal manifestations. A person dies. Funerals and memorials reaffirm the primary questions. Resources controlled by the deceased are reallocated through inheritance or are destroyed, and roles and obligations, reassigned or forgotten (see anthropological works on inheritance and succession going back many years, such as Downing 1973 and Goody 1969, 1970). Memories and losses are felt and real, but life goes on. Comparable rearrangements occur when new members join the society, at birth or initiation. Weddings, funerals, and other rites of passage routinely reallocate resources, mending inescapable demographic rifts and redefining the players but not the playing field. Moreover, these rearrangements strengthen the culture as individuals reaffirm their shared values. In a comparable manner, the needs of the vulnerable—women, children, the elderly, the landless, the disabled—are met by social institutions and interpersonal reciprocities that supply them with critical life-sustaining resources. The resiliency of peoples may be measured by their ability to mobilize resources during these micro-disruptions.¹

Psycho-social and cultural landscapes are crowded with the results of previous, often long-forgotten, negotiations and micro-disruptions. Over time, every nook and cranny, every event, every rule is the product of intense social interactions. The landscapes take many forms, including civic calendars, time zones, property lines, zoning, parks, household gardens, buildings, and bus routes. Negotiations may be as simple as discussions about where events should be located and disputes over space or what to call something. Traditional public areas, for example, are often the product of generations-old conflicts and compromises invisible to current users (Aronsson 2002). Cultural landscapes often take on nonmaterial form, such as titles, positions, "rights," names, and kinship categories.

In the race to build infrastructure, a community that is in the way may appear to outsiders to be little more than an impoverished place, devoid of
the rich meaning found in more affluent surroundings. Not true. Move closer and the layers of cultural onion seem infinite. During the senior author’s four years in Arizona as a lawmaker, he spent thousands of hours refining and adding to the State of Arizona’s statutory law. More than twelve thousand pages of Arizona law are the residual product of almost one hundred years of negotiations; they are the formal rules for social relationships for 6.5 million people, institutions, companies, and interests. For most Arizonans, however, the rules of routine culture are unrecorded—the product of a shared culture, an unwritten code much larger than statutory laws.

The spatial and temporal organization of routines (Downing 1996a) gives communities and individuals constructed predictability; at certain places and times, their primary questions are repeatedly addressed and answered. When is it? Christmas. Where am I? At home. Who am I with? My family. What are Christians doing? Celebrating the birth of Jesus. And so it goes, with time, place, and personages redefined according to a culture’s particular constructs. The economic constructs and actions are particularly fundamental to routine culture, ensuring both identification and continuous supply or usage of resources and energy that meet the material needs of individuals and institutions. It is here that natural cycles (such as seasonal changes) intermesh with cultural constructs. Cyclical variation in food and income are predictable and are planned for accordingly.

In brief, routine culture imparts a degree of order, stability, security, and predictability in daily life, a sense of health and well-being.

DISSONANT CULTURE

Involuntary displacement drastically destabilizes routine culture by threatening it or rendering it meaningless. Then, social life becomes chaotic, uncertain, and unpredictable. Routine culture gives way to what we shall call dissonant culture—a temporary reordering of space, time, relationships, norms, and psycho-socio-cultural constructs. Dissonant culture, like inharmonious music that causes tension, cries out for a resolution. Tactical maneuvers of individuals and institutions become disconnected from future actions. The game cannot be played without a field. Depending on how this threat is handled, involuntary displacement may invalidate the previously constructed answers to primary culture, including associated institutions. Although the people may physically survive, culturally what was is no more.

Dissonance usually appears long before physical displacement. Almost every observer of an involuntary displacement has reported that psycho-
socio-cultural changes appear well before infrastructure construction or relocation actually begins. Scudder (2005a) and Scudder and Colson (1982) found in their work with the Gwenebe Tonga, in connection with the Kariba Dam, that those destined to be displaced refused, initially, to believe that they were going to be forced to relocate. The depth of the dissonance is difficult to imagine and stretches far beyond micro-disruptions. Inga-Lill Aronsson (2002) offers one of the few firsthand observations about the appearance of dissonant culture. Living with her young child among the group to be resettled, she shared with them the disbelief that everything the people knew was about to change—until the blasting began. When familiar features of the landscape were dynamited, the project-affected people realized that what they could barely imagine or not imagine was coming true.

Within the displaced population, the risks of social impoverishment usually are distributed unevenly. The vulnerable are likely to lose access to an often overburdened social safety net. Demographics, location, and income differences may inadvertently expose some parts of the population more than others. Temporal routines, such as going to work, leaving the kids at school, taking lunch breaks, getting a haircut, shopping, enjoying a morning coffee, and the like, are gone. Socially constructed relationships may be temporarily, and sometimes permanently, broken. The position of the social unit—be it a household, family, or village—relative to other non-affected social units may change (marginalization). The routine provisioning of food breaks down—not from cyclical scarcity but from unanticipated events and with an uncertain chance of replenishment.

As resettlement nears, dissonance simultaneously spreads across the culture. Productive activities are disrupted. Resources, such as land and jobs, are either irrelevant or gone. Schooling and socialization activities become difficult to sustain because what is being taught is disarticulated from present and future value. Social arrangements that allow sharing of common goods become insignificant because the common resource is insufficient, disappearing, or gone. Intensified, involuntary displacement may break a people’s social geometry, the bonds that, in routine culture, were continually re-created by socially constructed time, space, and personages (Downing 1996a).

Researching the psycho-socio-cultural processes is not easy. Economic sciences have not been very useful in explaining the mega-changes unleashed by extensive socio-cultural disorganization, especially when it involves forced displacement. Part of the problem is that it is methodologically challenging; too much happens to too many people too fast.
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Apart from those displaced, few have witnessed the full force of the dissonant phase of an involuntary displacement. At another place and time, we walked the streets of the new central Mexican town of Bella Vista del Río a few weeks after its new inhabitants were involuntarily relocated to make way for the Zimapán Dam (Aronsson 2002; Greaves 1997; Guggenheim 1991, 1993). This was at dusk, usually a time of substantial activity. Children played basketball under the newly installed streetlights, but adults were not to be seen. Something was wrong. Each family sat in its house in silence. Elderly stared at the walls or rocked back and forth in chairs, gazing into space. No laughter. No radios playing. Conversations were truncated. Few tasks were being done. People just sat there, like props in a museum. A year later, the evening streets more closely resembled nonrelocated village streets.

Those fortunate enough to have never experienced dissonant culture may come close to observing spatial and temporal dissonance in the live media coverage of natural disasters. On 9/11/2001 and then again during the Katrina hurricane in 2005, nonspecialists somewhat witnessed the chaos of dissonant culture—even if it was observed through the media. The familiar site of the World Trade Center was part of the routine culture of millions of Americans, including those who had never been to New York City. As repeated millions of times since, “everything changed at 9/11,” and it was not as simple as the beginning of the War on Terror. What changed, in an instant, was the vulnerability of the American self-defined routine culture.

Thus far, we have identified four patterns of dissonant culture that reappear cross-culturally and in different kinds of infrastructure development. Further research will undoubtedly find more. First, dissonant culture may show the emergence of ephemeral dissonance norms that, to those living in routine culture, may appear to be social pathologies or unanticipated social alliances. These norms have their own situational logic, which might be unacceptable in routine culture. The news media and their viewers witnessed survivors of Hurricane Katrina searching for food, water, and security (see Button, chapter 12, this volume). Some in the media applied nondissonant culture norms, calling them looters. Others viewed them as victims.

An American television network’s videotape crew followed one of the two hundred thousand families (the Locketts) left homeless by 1992 Hurricane Andrew (ABC News 1992). The Locketts are an extended, sixty-five-member matriarchal clan that, before the disaster, had occupied sixteen homes in Homestead, Florida. Homeless, without belongings, they were temporarily relocated in a high school auditorium. The Lockett clan’s women concentrated on reestablishing a temporary order for their family,
focusing on the children. The women stressed that it is important that the children be fed “three meals a day, bathe, and get to bed on time.” At the shelter, each part of the family organized a small personal space. The children’s behavior in their socially defined space was of considerable concern as the mothers struggled to establish where they perceived the children should and should not go within the school auditorium and yard. In the ABC interviews, the matriarch described what she felt was her (unstated) contract with the shelter workers: “If the children don’t get out of line...don’t go where they’re not supposed to...then we won’t get kicked out into the streets” (ABC News 1992). What normatively should have been a family micro-disruption in routine culture turned into a community ritual when the entire gymnasium of relocates joined in celebrating a child’s birthday.

A second pattern is dissonance overload, the overburdening of appropriate cultural responses to meet new risks. In routine culture, people draw temporarily upon their kinship and friendship networks for the extra resources during micro-disruptions. The disturbance from involuntary displacement may be so extensive and prolonged as to overload the traditional coping and support mechanisms (Scudder 2005a). Worse yet, those to whom one would turn in times of need are also seeking assistance. The threat may be not only psycho-social but also physical. Cultural responses to diseases are critical parts of a cultural inventory, and their disruption may increase mortality (see Kedia, chapter 5, this volume). Wolde-Selassie (2000) found that Ethiopians displaced by the 1984–1985 drought and famine faced new diseases, including malaria and cattle sickness. Out of 594,190 resettlers, an estimated 32,800 died. Similarly, in Orissa, India, twenty-two villages displaced by the Ramial River Project dam experienced increases in cerebral malaria, typhoid, and jaundice, as well as increases in infant and child mortality (Mahapatra and Mahapatra 2000). Developing new cultural strategies to cope with a radically changed community-health profile may take generations. In Bangladesh, the social disarticulation resulting from an involuntary, project-related displacement has also been shown to constrict a society’s capacity to respond to recurring natural disasters (Hutton and Haque 2004).

Third, the disturbance of routine culture may begin an impoverishment process by redefining access to routinely allocated resources. Moreover, economic actions that are seemingly unrelated to the displacement may decline. In Orissa, India, Behura and Nayak (1993) noted that development-displaced peoples, irrespective of their previous economic background, underwent economic hardship. They noted that the disruption caused by resettlement not only caused economic hardship but also changed the socioeconomic
configuration of their rural society (Behura and Nayak 1998). Similarly, the capacity of the displaced to protect their health and nutrition may diminish (Kedia and van Willigen 2008). In the Alto Bio Bio region of southern Chile, we interviewed people displaced by the Ralco Dam who felt that the displacement had lengthened the time and distance to their health outposts, making access to already limited resources even more difficult (Downing and Garcia-Downing 2001). The Pehuenche indigenous peoples had limited access to legal, education, and health information. The increase in distance diminished the probability of mitigating or avoiding displacement- and resettlement-induced impoverishment.

Fourth, displaces may increase the frequency of rituals that once reaffirmed group identity. In the Mexican project mentioned earlier, in June 1994 we observed an increase in ritual behavior by relocatees from the small Catholic community of La Vega. Before their relocation, once a year they moved their village patron saint from one private household to another and then celebrated a special annual mass. Immediately following resettlement, the saint began weekly instead of annual visits, moving from one relocated household to the next as the community struggled to reaffirm and reestablish its identity.

Apart from these four patterns, some universal psycho-social responses appear during what we are calling the dissonant period (Silove and Steel 2006). One that appears to be closely associated with the shift from routine to dissonant culture is the reports of the involuntarily displaced experiencing a dreamlike state, which seems to be some form of poorly understood dissociation of consciousness. Following Hurricane Andrew, the Lockett matriarch stumbled through the ruins of what, a week before, had been her home. She described her post-relocation situation as "like a dream in which you wake up." Using almost identical words, in June 1994 in central Mexico, a young wife described her loss to us. We were leaving a mountaintop where we had watched a new Zimapán reservoir slowly flooding what had been her family's home for many generations: "Like a dream. Someday I will wake up." In both cases, the women's expressions are more than metaphors. In human experience, dreams are thoughts disoriented in time and space (Friedlander 1940). We anticipate that this form of dissociation of consciousness will occur more frequently among women than men, but controlled research is necessary.

**NEW ROUTINE CULTURE**

Establishment of a new routine culture begins quickly, or else people have no answers to their primary questions: not only where am I and where
are we, but also, more fundamentally, who am I and who are we? Some elements of a new routine culture begin to rearticulate almost immediately. Relationship by relationship, decision by decision, block by block, group by group, new routines crystallize. New organizations appear. In Orissa, India, at the Ramial Resettlement and Rehabilitation operation, Mahapatra and Mahapatra (2000) found that ten years after relocation, displacees had formed new conflict-resolution committees, youth and women's clubs, lending societies, and ritual organizations to cope with relocation challenges.

The emergence of what we are calling a new routine culture is not well understood and depends on the degree of disruption (de Wet 2005, 2006). Temporally, not everything comes together at once. It is as if different "articulation clocks" are ticking in different places for different groups. As displacees attempt to reestablish a new routine, Scudder (1981b, 2005a) reports, they favor incremental change over transformational change. They build on their familiar, earlier routines. He observed people maintaining ties to kin, replicating former house types, and transferring crops and productive techniques to the new area, regardless of their compatibility. The changes, in turn, followed their own patterns.

Let us call the time between the appearance of dissonant culture and the appearance of a new routine culture as the "dissonant interval." In essence, this measures the lifespan of the transition from routine, to dissonance, to new routine (R→D→R'). Methodologically, there are simultaneous, multiple R→D→R' cycles. The R→D→R' model we are proposing complements the temporal sequencing of changes in the celebrated stage model developed by Scudder and Colson (1982; see a summary of Scudder's life work in Scudder 2005a and chapter 2, this volume). Scudder (1981b) found that his stage two of involuntary resettlement, the adjustment and coping phase, lasted at least a year and usually ended after stage three.

New social articulations, the onset of a new routine culture, may also begin and end at different times within a population. People may reestablish a new routine for their children's education but remain in dissonance over how they make a living. Some families or communities within the same involuntary resettlement may develop a new routine; others may be slower in doing so. Because the shift from routine, to dissonance, to a new routine may begin and end at different times, our R→D→R' model is not a stage model.

Certain new socio-cultural articulations may not be sustainable. A new routine may surface and then revert back to dissonant culture. In southern Chile, we observed the routine, deeply impoverished herding-and-gathering economy of Pehuenche Indians disrupted by the construction
and relocation of the Ralco and Pangue dams (Downing 1996b; Downing and Garcia-Downing 2001). Initial dissonance from loss of daily and seasonal agricultural activities was replaced by a new, temporary routine for those who found employment at the construction site (Johnston and Garcia-Downing 2004). When construction ended, many Pehuenche plunged into a new dissonant culture. In our simple notation, this would be \( R \rightarrow D \rightarrow R' \rightarrow D' \) until a new, more lasting routine, \( R'' \), takes hold.

In a comparable fashion, dissonant culture dreams may morph into economic delusions. Returning to Zimapán, we witnessed three communities being forcefully resettled from highly productive riverside and irrigated farmland to an arid plateau high above their villages. In meeting after meeting with the Mexican Federal Electric Commission responsible for the displacement, the displaced demanded an economically impractical irrigation scheme that would pump water thousands of feet up to their poor-quality land. This unrealistic expectation influenced their decision to forgo more economically rational alternatives (Aronsson 2002). They unexpectedly sold highly productive, irrigated land they had received in restitution, anticipating a future that would never be. Almost fifteen years later, an impressive community infrastructure rests on a high, arid mountain plateau, sustained by remittances from the United States, and the aridland agriculture yields a fraction of what the rich, now submerged river bottomland yielded.

Creative, unstable tension emerges. Does the new routine culture align with the old answers to the primary questions? If not, the answers to the primary questions must change, or dissonance will persist. The dynamics of psycho-socio-cultural change during the involuntary resettlement process are quite distinct from the patterns observed in economics. In economics, it is possible to recover lost income or property. Restoration is feasible. In the psycho-socio-cultural realm, it is highly unlikely. Humpty-Dumpty cannot be put back together again.

**STEPS TO FACILITATE THE TRANSITION**

What can be done, if anything, to avoid or limit cultural dissonance induced by involuntary resettlement and, if unavoidable, to facilitate the establishment of a new routine culture? The first two of seven steps are (1) to recognize fallacies that may become excuses for inaction in avoiding or mitigating PSC risks and (2) to ensure that the appropriate laws and policies and financing are in place. (3) There must also be clear objectives with respect to desired PSC outcomes. The chances for smooth articulation to a
new routine may be improved by (4) strengthening baseline studies, (5) ensuring that vulnerable peoples are protected, (6) providing procedures that encourage displaced persons to participate actively in displacement decisions that affect their destiny, and (7) actively promoting socio-cultural and psychological innovations that directly address the rebuilding of a new routine.

National laws and policies, as they presently stand, are economically underdesigned and do not address PSC disruptions. The lack of attention to PSC risks and mitigation is partially a consequence of misunderstandings about the socio-cultural changes that we have just described. In particular, several fallacies impede action to address the moral and legal obligations of governments, owners, and financiers for PSC disruptions and the articulation of new, meaningful routine culture.

Rejecting Fallacies

The compensation-is-enough fallacy holds that the moral and economic obligations to displaced persons are met by compensation payments. This assumption is deeply embedded in national laws, that compensation is, a priori, assumed by the taking party to include all the costs of involuntary resettlement, including financing of PSC recovery. Not so. Cervera and his colleagues have successfully argued that, from an economic perspective, involuntary resettlement policy has not incorporated critical knowledge from scores of empirical studies, project evaluations, and theoretical works that confirm that compensation alone cannot provide a financial platform for the recovery of the economic losses occurring in involuntary resettlement (Cervera 2008a; Cervera and Mathur 2008).

Involuntary resettlement specialists insist that compensation is not enough for restoration of lost livelihoods. This fallacy was incorporated into the World Bank's involuntary resettlement policies despite early warnings that the planned benefits should be higher than their previous standard of living and that displaced persons must be made better off and beneficiaries of a project (Scudder 2005a:279, quoting correspondence of May 17, 1979). The fallacy has persisted through subsequent policy updates in the different international institutions and is part of an ongoing controversy over the updating of the Asian Development Bank's involuntary resettlement policy (Downing and Scudder 2008).

Let there be no misunderstanding. Resources are a necessary precondition for social recovery (Cervera, chapter 3, this volume; Oliver-Smith 2005a). Without viable livelihoods—which mean sustainable income streams better
than those before displacement—articulation of a new routine culture is more difficult. Scarce human energy and capital must be triaged in favor of basic survival.

It is naive to assume that social recovery occurs when the material needs—such as income, housing, livelihood, productive systems, jobs, compensation, and social infrastructure—are met (de Wet 2006; Oliver-Smith 2005a; Tamondong-Helin 1996). Nor can economic gains, rare as they may be, be used as a surrogate for judging post-displacement social success (Partridge 1993) because even the opposite may occur. For example, Hirschon (2000) found that a refugee settlement in Greece suffered a decline in economic welfare but developed a higher degree of social integration and community than it had before displacement. And to make matters worse, both national laws and international safeguards may constrain successful recovery (Scudder 2005a). It is not simply a matter of getting it right—having a law or policy—but also not getting it wrong.

The strict-compliance fallacy holds that resettlement risks have been addressed if a project follows applicable planning, policies, private agreements, or laws. The World Bank's and other international financial intermediaries’ approach to involuntary resettlement is heavily front-loaded towards planning. The IFIs and their public- and private-sector clients have prepared several thousand Resettlement Action Plans (RAPs) as part of the routine social and environmental due diligence for project appraisal. The World Bank RAP guidelines are detailed in Annex A of OP (Operational Policy) 4.12. The annex requires social and economic studies, not simply a compilation of information. The studies should include a 100 percent census of current occupants of the affected area; standard characteristics of displaced households (including production system, labor, and household organization); baseline information on livelihoods and standards of living; the magnitude of expected loss; and information on vulnerable groups (World Bank Operational Policy on Involuntary Resettlement, OP 4.12, the World Bank, Annex A, par. 6). In August 2008 we measured more than 28 feet of RAPs on the shelves of the World Bank's Info Shop in Washington DC. After the respective boards approve RAPs, the IFI staff supervises and evaluates their implementation. In reality, supervision is often limited to a few weeks or less than a year on relatively large projects, and the focus is on checking compliance with the RAP.

The strict-compliance fallacy may become inappropriate folded into legal agreements, financial negotiations, or project documents that unfairly limit future claims of displaced persons. Unaware of the full extent of their risks, displaced persons are asked to sign compensation agree-
ments to make no further claims regarding damages or loss of assets. Not
only the displaced, but in the case of private-sector projects, even govern-
ments may be unaware of agreements that may require public commit-
ments to address project-induced impoverishment among the displaced
persons. These agreements will when exposed to the bright sunlight of
international human rights standards (Johnston and Garcia-Downing
2004). At question is not whether an agreement is necessary, which it may
well be, but the coercive, nontransparent nature of such agreements and
whether they are being made with full, informed consent of the displaced.
Technically, the resulting compensation agreements may limit the project
sponsor’s liability, but from the perspective of economics, science, and
social justice, the documents are coerced works of fiction.

On the project sponsor’s or owner’s side, unresolved economic and
social impacts of involuntary resettlement may cause problems. Project
sponsors and financiers want to avoid leaving a project’s ledger with
unspecified liabilities—real or perceived. As scientific research has uncov-
ered livelihood risks, apart from the value of lost land or housing, the pos-
sibility arises that a project’s ledger may show unspecified and lingering
uncompensated liabilities to the displaced.

A third, the blame-the-victims fallacy, holds that the displacees’ PSC or
economic problems are a consequence of their failure to take advantage of
the opportunities offered to them. This fallacy is most common when base-
line studies of displaced persons are poorly done or missing altogether. It
also tends to surface when projects involve indigenous, traditional peoples
or ethnic minorities. The fallacy derives from, and feeds, stereotypes that
portray indigenous, traditional, or powerless peoples as irrational or cus-
tom bound or as obstacles to national development. On more than one
occasion, we have listened to sponsors and financiers argue that it is better
to compensate displaced peoples in cash because, if they were given land
for land, they would just turn around and sell it. Instead of assumptions,
the preferences of even the poorest, most illiterate peoples should be mea-
sured and reported, even if culturally unexpected results appear. In Chile,
we designed methodological instruments that enabled indigenous, mostly
illiterate peoples to define and choose between alternative investments
(Downing 1996b). Our work proved that Chile’s poorest indigenous group,
the Pehuenche, was willing to forego short-term cash rewards in favor of
long-term investments in the group’s survival, even at the risk of hunger
(Downing 1996b).

The fourth, the someone-else-should-pay fallacy, is that the project design-
ers, governments, and financiers are not legally or economically responsible
for PSC disruptions and changes. The questions of "who is and who is not liable" and "liable for what" turn out to be highly dynamic areas of modern jurisprudence in international displacement policy and, to a lesser extent, in national and subnational laws. Elsewhere, we distinguish liabilities that are widely acknowledged from those that appear weakly articulated with a project (possible liabilities) and those that seem probable (Downing 2002a). This liability line shifts back and forth as new research becomes available.

Fifth and last, the-clock-stops-with-construction fallacy is that external responsibilities to the displaced end with the completion of the RAPs or construction phase of projects. Crystallization of a new routine is likely to take time and most likely will extend beyond infrastructure construction. RAPs are frequently prepared and, unfortunately, approved with budgets and timelines co-terminous with the completion of the physical infrastructure or tranches of a loan. The fallacy is that the economics or socio-cultural and economic dynamics of an involuntary resettlement end when project construction ends.

**Ensuring Adequate Legal and Policy Frameworks**

An effective struggle to work past these fallacies and secure social justice for displaced persons should not begin, a nova, with each project. Sustainable social justice that ensures that displaced persons will improve their livelihoods, benefit from development, and have viable societies and cultures requires that entitlements be formalized, literally embedded in laws, policies, bureaucratic procedures, and project financing. Sustainability is further strengthened by aligning these formalized laws and policies with the socio-cultural dynamics of involuntary resettlement.

The R→D→R′ indicates that the ability of displaced peoples to articulate their new routine culture may be improved or hindered by external actions—including the stimulus causing the displacement and the legal and policy frameworks defining the rights of the displaced. Globally, advocates for social justice, involuntary resettlement specialists, NGOs, and allies within international organizations have worked together to ensure due diligence of IFIs in the area of involuntary resettlement. Specifically, they have pressured and helped prepare involuntary resettlement policy frameworks that detail avoidance, risk, and mitigation measures for people who are in the way of a specific development project. Comparable struggles occur at the national and subnational levels but are weakly, if not totally, unarticulated with the international efforts.

Obligations of those benefiting from a development project to those they displace are expressed in both hard and soft laws. Hard laws refer to
legally binding obligations that are precise (or can be made precise through adjudication or the issuance of detailed regulations) and that delegate authority for interpreting and implementing the laws (Abbott and Snidal 2000). Hard laws are codified and subject to courts and enforcement actions. In most nation-states, the laws related to the involuntary takings of assets are well defined. Sovereign governments gain the allegiance of their subjects by creating, recognizing, and regulating property rights (Oliver-Smith 2008). To protect their integrity, sovereign governments or their designated jurisdictions define situations and compensation systems in which these rights may be withdrawn (for example, eminent domain, compulsory acquisition, and takings).

Soft laws begin when legal arrangements are weakened along the dimensions of obligation, precision, and delegation (Abbott and Snidal 2000). Consequently, there are differing degrees of "softness." Abbott and Snidal point out that soft legalization is becoming increasingly used by financial actors, firms, activist groups, and non-state-based groups to mitigate loss of sovereignty and contracting costs of working through a legal framework and to provide a tool of compromise in bargaining, particularly between weak and strong parties.

This is certainly true in the area of involuntary resettlement. Over the past thirty years, an emerging body of standards and principles is redefining the responsibilities of governments, financial intermediaries, and owners to people being displaced by development projects over and above those in national or subnational law. These soft laws include financial lenders' safeguard policies, international covenants between lenders or corporations, corporate social responsibility policies, contracts, and informal agreements. The World Bank (1990, 1994, and 2001) has revised its involuntary resettlement policies for its lending portfolios, along with procedural guidelines for its staffs (see the World Bank's Involuntary Resettlement Policy and Procedures OP/BP 4.12 and the International Finance Corporation PS5). Other international financial intermediaries (IFIs) with involuntary resettlement policies include the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (1991), the Inter-American Development Bank (1998), and the Asian Development Bank (1998). Recently, sixty of the world's leading financial institutions and the International Finance Corporation (IFC, the private sector arm of The World Bank Group) agreed on involuntary resettlement guidelines within the Equator Principles (IFC 2006b) and have tried to use their syndicated financial leverage to encourage national governments and private partners to move beyond simple, legalistic, cash compensation of taken land to a more
comprehensive approach (Clark, Fox, and Treakle 2003; Kardam 1993; see Clark, chapter 9, this volume). The World Commission on Dams (WCD) has also developed criteria and guidelines for addressing the involuntary resettlement risks facing peoples displaced by large dams (WCD 2000b; also see Scudder 2005a).

National and subnational laws tend to focus on the level, form, and timing of compensation; eligibility for compensation; notification; and grievance and appeal procedures. Psycho-socio-cultural impacts are largely ignored. In contrast, the emerging safeguard policies move beyond arrangements for compensation for forced takings. The central focus is on economic restoration and development for the displaced. Benefiting from experience, criticism, evaluation, and research, most of the IFIs are gradually strengthening these safeguard policies to address multiple livelihood risks (Cernea, ed. 1999). It appears that soft law on involuntary resettlement is changing faster than hard law, probably because revision of hard law is more deeply enshrined in political and legislative processes. Specifically, the soft laws include remedies that may not be evident in national laws, including preferences of land-for-land replacement for lost assets, compensation at replacement value, restoration of housing, provisions for income losses (usually, local jobs during construction), infrastructure reconstruction, special consideration for vulnerable groups, and some efforts to restore damaged livelihoods (Cernea, ed. 1999, 2000a, and chapter 3, this volume). Conversely, safeguard policies fall short of specifying legal procedures that displaced persons might use within national laws to contest the arrangements offered to mitigate their losses.

By now, these policies and the associated entitlements for displaced persons, including the requirement for RAPs, are becoming embedded in soft international laws and are routinely incorporated into international lending agreements, particularly in infrastructure projects financed by syndicated loans involving a broad mix of private and public investors. As a result, displaced persons sometimes face multiple, contradictory levels of soft and hard laws, international standards, and national legal and regulatory frameworks. The situation becomes even more complex because of divergent expectations among the displaced over what is and is not an appropriate quid pro quo for the forceful taking of their properties and other rights (see Danielson 2004 for a general review of standards in the natural resource industries). The senior author's recent analysis of an involuntary resettlement complaint to the World Bank's Inspection Panel (2008a) provides a glimpse of this complexity. The Yoruba of southwestern Nigeria were having their lands taken to make way for the West African Gas
Pipeline (WAGP). As we investigated complaints about unfair compensation, we found three layers of soft laws overlaying the compulsory acquisition laws of what was an appropriate payment to displaced persons as defined by Nigeria law (hard). The soft law included a Nigeria oil-industry standard, a WAGP project interpretation of the World Bank standard of replacement value (soft, but higher entitlement), and a World Bank policy-defined standard based on livelihood restoration (soft, but even higher entitlement) (World Bank Inspection Panel 2008a:ch. III, 27–81). The entitlements calculated in these frameworks, measured by compensation per unit of land, differed by a factor of more than 10. Thus, the WAGP pipeline owners and the displaced persons made different claims and counterclaims within these four frameworks.

The processes for changing hard and soft law differ. More lasting changes in the rights of the displaced come from changes at the national and subnational levels. However, change at this level is the most difficult. Historically, priorities favor provisioning of infrastructure over livelihood restoration, and livelihood restoration over PSC issues. The battle over IFI policy formation involves an often intense dialogue between the IFI boards, their staff, and major social and environmental NGO stakeholders. It is seldom subject to public scrutiny. In sharp contrast, the changes in hard laws on eminent domain or takings require full immersion in a political process.

Having been elected to two terms in the Arizona legislature, the senior author can testify that even incremental changes in law in the United States may take several years, considerable organization, and money. The process involves dealing with lawmakers and other stakeholders. And, in the political arena, unlike in science, logical and economic rationality may not have a seat at the table. The upside of this effort is that after changes become formalized, they have a broader impact than dealing with individual cases. Moreover, reversal of gains is equally, if not more, difficult than their achievement. Social scientists and civil society organizations (CSOs) in Asia, particularly India and China, have taken more interest in national changes. In sharp contrast, social scientists or social justice advocates in developed countries have not taken an active role in comparable issues such as the firesstorm that erupted over displacement (phrased as property rights) in almost every state following the US Supreme Court decision *Kelo v. City of New London* 545 US 469 (2005).

The ingenuity of the legislative process is that it has “rules for making rules” that all stakeholders may follow, that is, majority votes, committee hearings, notification times, and the like. In contrast, the rule-making processes for changing involuntary resettlement policies of IFIs are ambiguous. In
the World Bank, the involuntary resettlement policy has the status of an operational procedure (OP) and a bank procedure (BP) for due diligence on investments that carry the disclaimer that they are "prepared for use by World Bank staff and are not necessarily a complete treatment on the subject" (World Bank 2001:1). Consequently, civil society must simultaneously battle social justice policy issues and attempt to negotiate its place within an idiosyncratic policy-making process (Downing et al. 2003). From 2006 through fall 2008, the Asian Development Bank and the Asian Forum were engaged in a contentious dialogue over the consultation procedure for updating the Asian Development Bank's involuntary resettlement policy, as well as the issue of the policy itself (Downing and Scudder 2008). After a failed attempt at public consultation that was boycotted by the major NGOs, the Asian Development Bank had to negotiate a new consultation.

Despite these obstacles, the involuntary resettlement policies have undergone progressive changes. Agencies and advocates have made incremental progress that has increased the opportunities for displaced persons to articulate a new routine culture. Progress can be measured in the realm of both procedural and distributive justice (Paavola and Adger 2002). Our remaining discussion focuses on the World Bank's Operational Policy/Bank Procedures on Involuntary Resettlement OP/BP 4.12 because the World Bank has been the progenitor of other IFI and private-sector involuntary resettlement policies.

**Setting a Psycho-socio-cultural Objective**

The R→D→R' theoretical framework argues that preservation of a routine culture is unrealistic, if not impossible. Current World Bank involuntary resettlement policy is ambivalent and generalized, requiring that "to the extent possible, the existing social and cultural institutions of settlers and any host communities are preserved" (OP 4.12, par. 18[a]). Whereas preservation, restoration, rehabilitation, and recovery may be feasible, albeit inadequate, targets for discussions of livelihood or living standards, these concepts are nearly meaningless in the socio-cultural and psychological realm. An objective more attuned to the social dynamics of involuntary resettlement would be that a meaningful, new articulation occurs when displaced persons can once more answer their primary questions: Who are we? Where are we? Where are we coming from? Where are we going? Why do people live and die? What are our responsibilities to others and to ourselves? The articulation consists of a network of interlocking routines and institutions to which people are willing to dedicate their time and resources. The answers may differ from those of the preceding routine.
culture. When a new articulation begins, people regain the ability to define their temporal, spatial, and social order—their social geometry—in ways comparable to those of people around them who were not displaced (excluding host communities whose routines may also be disrupted by the displacement).

Enhancing Baseline Analysis

IFI and national policies require collection of baseline information on the properties and population to be affected. The technical annex of OP 4.12 requires a RAP assessing the impoverishment risks and mitigation measures to be based on socio-economic studies conducted early on in project preparation and with the involvement of the displaced persons (OP 4.12, Annex A, par. 6). Specifically, these studies require a census survey of current occupants of the affected area, standard characteristics of displaced households (including production system, labor, and household organization), information on livelihoods and standards of living, the magnitude of expected loss, and information on vulnerable groups (OP 4.12, Annex A, 2001, par. 6(v)). The studies should also describe the patterns of social interaction in the affected communities, including social networks and support systems, as well as other socio-cultural characteristics of the displaced communities. These characteristics include their formal and informal institutions that may be relevant to the consultation strategy and to designing and implementing the resettlement activities (OP 4.12, par. 6(b), ii, iv). All the above are to be prepared with the participation of the potentially affected people and to be updated at regular intervals (OP 4.12, Annex A, 2001, par. 6(v)). Although these policies do not explicitly require studies of routine-dissonant culture, if done by a competent socio-economic specialist, they fit within the policy framework, particularly if included within the RAP's terms of reference. Unfortunately, RAPs seldom move past a cursory examination of socio-cultural issues, particularly of the spatial-temporal order and routines. Participation is almost cynically defined as answering questionnaires, listening to information, or being given promotional presentations on the benefits of the project (World Bank Inspection Panel 2008a, 2008b). Consequently, the policy should be strengthened by making explicit reference to describing the spatial and temporal organization of the displaced persons and their communities.

When socio-economic studies pay attention to the full socio-cultural domain, the results have proven positive not only for the people but also for the project sponsors. During an appraisal for World Bank financing, social science consultants discovered that the Aguamilpa Hydroelectric
Dam in Western Mexico would inundate a highly sacred ceremonial site of the Huichol Indian water goddess Nakahue at the convergence of the Santiago and Huynamota rivers (Downing 1987; Malgos Sandoval 1995). Bank and Mexican anthropologists and the chief engineer consulted and negotiated with groups of shamans for movement of the site to a new location on the edge of the reservoir. The relocation ran coterminously with the construction and took several years. The result was a successful mitigation, without loss of the cultural ceremonial routine. Traditional ceremonies punctuated the dam construction up to, and including, its inauguration in 1995 by the president of Mexico. Unanticipated at the time, the Huichol were later to view the entire reservoir as sacred (Nahmad-Situn, personal communication, August 2008).

Active participation of the displaced peoples in the socio-economic study may help them anticipate and begin to mitigate PSC disruptions. At Zimapán Dam in Central Mexico, arrangements were made for community leaders to visit a previously displaced community to review the displacement experiences of their counterparts. The initial result was disbelief, requiring subsequent confirmation visits by a larger segment of the community. This method stimulated broad community participation in the planning and execution of its own resettlement, in what has become a classic case in the involuntary resettlement literature (Aronsson 2002; Downing 1987; Greaves 1997; Guggenheim 1991, 1993).

Protecting the Vulnerable

The disruptions of involuntary resettlement fall heavier on some than others, which poses an additional challenge to building new social safety nets in a new routine culture. Studies have shown that involuntary resettlement is likely to create new poverty and often exacerbate existing inequalities within displaced communities, handicapping some people more than others as they try to recover economically and socially (Cernea 2000c; Cernea and Mathur 2008; Downing 2002a, 2002b; Pandey 1998a, 1998b, 1998c; Scudder and Colson 1980). In this regard, the involuntary resettlement policies of the IFIs are more sensitive to issues of equity and fairness than are many of the eminent domain laws of nation-states. For example, the World Bank Operational Policy on Involuntary Resettlement recognizes those with informal claims to the land, provided that such claims become recognized through a process identified in the RAP (OP 4.12, par. 15), apart from claims recognized in a country. The involuntary resettlement policies of the IFIs also call for particular attention to the needs of vulnerable groups among those displaced, especially those below...
the poverty line, the landless, the elderly, women and children, indigenous peoples, tenants and sharecroppers, ethnic minorities, or other displaced persons who may not be protected through national land-compensation legislation (OP 4.12, par. 8). Although the US Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisitions Policies for Federal and Federally Assisted Programs also focus on equitable treatment, they do not pay particular attention to vulnerable peoples and exclude from eligibility persons who are not lawfully in the country (US Code Title 42, Chapter 6).

An example illustrates how critical the disturbance of routine culture may be to the future life of the vulnerable. Routines of children are often a neglected element in involuntary resettlement. Near Kampala, Uganda, the senior author interviewed people who had grown impatient waiting five years for a planned resettlement to make way for an electrical transmission line (World Bank Inspection Panel 2008b). Their willingness to relocate was mixed with concern that the move may occur after the annual school enrollment, making it difficult if not impossible for displaced children to enroll or transfer between government schools. School fees account for 23 percent of the affected households’ spending, underscoring education’s significance to the displaced. Thousands of children were in a comparable situation along the transmission line. The timing decision represents a substantial loss of human capital, which, according to mothers, may be irreparable for teenagers if the disruption derails their studies. Options, such as paying for full enrollment and transportation costs to private schools or adjusting the time of the move, have not yet been considered. Ironically, enrollment in school had been selected as one of the eight indicators for the involuntary resettlement’s outcome evaluation, meaning that inattention to the problem threatened to skew the overall project evaluation negatively. One solution would be for the project to cover the costs of private school tuition, which is a relative small cost compared with the future value of disrupting students’ lives and delaying the project.

**Providing Procedural Empowerment**

Displaced persons begin to articulate their new routine culture when they are able to make cumulative decisions to redefine and control their new environment to the point that they can answer, once more, primary questions and reorganize their socio-economic life. This is difficult. The displaced persons have lost control of their spatial and temporal order and of rights that most thought were inalienable. Offers are being made to monetize things around them that they never dreamt of selling. Strangers are setting timelines for meetings and relocation. And social support
networks may be threatened. Leaders are trying to make decisions about the communities and simultaneously protect their own families and networks. And support networks are stressed and may now have conflicts of interest as neighbors vie for advantages.

Within this dissonant social and cultural context, the legal, policy, and procedural frameworks of the involuntary resettlement become much more than project and staff directives: they define the new, albeit temporary, routine. Within a short time, displaced persons must attempt to navigate the unfamiliar waters of planning, eligibility definition, compensation, disclosure to affected parties, impacts to be covered, exceptions to rules, reporting lines, delineation of intra-organizational responsibilities, elements to be addressed, grievance mechanisms, supervision, and monitoring requirements. When micro-disruptions occur in routine culture, specialists, such as attorneys, priests, and traditional healers, are enlisted for assistance. If this is the pattern under micro-disruptions, it is reasonable to expect that legal and other specialists be provided in the macro-disruptions of an involuntary resettlement.

In this context, national laws are procedurally detailed, compared with IFI global and regional policies, and usually administered by the state bureaucracy. National laws normally offer the displaced appellate rights, in hard law, and occasionally allow legal challenge and recovery of costs. In contrast, IFI procedural options are found in RAPs and other project-specific planning documents or contracts that should be, but seldom are, meaningfully disclosed to the affected peoples. RAPs are often administered by the infrastructure builder or sponsor, the contractor, a consultant, or a special involuntary resettlement unit formed within a government bureaucracy. The project-affected peoples cannot take the IFIs to court, and their complaints are limited to using a grievance mechanism set up by the project or to making a complaint through IFI accountability review mechanisms (the World Bank’s Inspection Panel, the African Development Bank’s Independent Review Mechanism, and the like). To date, no IFI has required, in policy, that its own involuntary resettlement policies be translated and meaningfully disclosed to project-affected peoples. Nor is there yet a policy requirement to include within project financing the provisioning of no-cost legal services.

The most significant involuntary resettlement objective is buried within existing policy. The framers of the World Bank policy set as one of its four principle objectives that displaced persons be meaningfully consulted and have opportunities to participate in planning and implementing resettlement programs (OP 4.12, par. 2[c]). Articulation of a new
routine begins with displaced persons regaining control of their own destinies. Meaningful, timely, and broadly disseminated disclosure (MTBDD) is a prerequisite to ending dissonance and articulating a new routine. Without MTBDD, each time the resettlement agency makes a new decision impacting the community, no matter how benevolent and well meaning, it reaffirms, at the PSC level, that the displaced persons and community are in dissonance, without control of their lives. In practice, MTBDD is too often misinterpreted as a way to reach the improvement of livelihoods and standards of living objectives, a means to an end, not a stand-alone objective. Failure to meaningfully disclose the policy itself to the displaced persons early in the involuntary resettlement denies the displaced persons knowledge of an entire corpus of rights that would assist in establishing a new routine. Some argue that this denial rises to the level of a possible human rights violation (Johnston and Garcia-Downing 2004).

Procedural empowerment is interlaced throughout existing policy. Procedural habilitation also begins when displaced peoples are empowered to gather and interpret information, identify pitfalls, and consider options by developing their own impoverishment-monitoring and impact-assessment capacities (Hirsch 1999). The Annex to OP 4.12 sets requirements that, if skillfully applied and aligned with the MTBDD objectives, could become methods for facilitating the emergence of a new routine. The World Bank's RAPs are supposed to provide for community participation, including an impressive list of actions that might improve the likelihood of a new and successful social articulation. Consistent with the overarching objective (OP 4.12, par. 2[b]), the policy calls for the RAP to include measures to ensure that displaced persons are informed about their options and rights pertaining to resettlement and consulted on, offered choices among, and provided with technically and economically feasible resettlement alternatives (OP 4.12, par. 6[a]iii). The RAP (OP 4.12, Annex A, par. 15) sets forth an aggressive agenda for community participation that includes the community's involvement in developing the following:

a. A description of the strategy for the hosts' consultation with resettlers and the resettlers' participation in the design and implementation of the resettlement activities.

b. A summary of the views expressed and how these views were taken into account in preparing the resettlement plan.

c. A review of the resettlement alternatives presented and the choices made by displaced persons regarding options available
to them, including choices related to forms of compensation and resettlement assistance, relocating as individuals families or as part of preexisting communities or kinship groups, sustaining existing patterns of group organization, and retaining access to cultural property (for example, places of worship, pilgrimage centers, and cemeteries).

d. Institutionalized arrangements by which displaced people can communicate their concerns to project authorities throughout planning and implementation, and measures to ensure adequate representation of such vulnerable groups as indigenous people, ethnic minorities, the landless, and women.

e. Procedural empowerment means that those who feel aggrieved and mistreated should have a way to express dissent. The ability to dissent and disagree is a critical part of the reorganization process, requiring that appropriate and accessible grievance mechanisms be established for displaced people (OP 4.12, par. 13[a]).

Under normal circumstances, without an involuntary displacement, any one of these issues could keep a society busy for years. But years may not be available, as the most precious of all resources, time, usually is needlessly limited by an external project-completion schedule (normally, two to six years for large infrastructure projects). More time is available for PSC rearticulation when the involuntary resettlement component is financed apart from infrastructure construction and a revenue stream continues from project-generated revenue (Cernea 2008c). Procedural empowerment also increases when displaced persons manage and control the project benefits.

**Developing Socio-cultural Innovations**

We are most encouraged by the appearance of innovations that may substantively help people avoid or escape dissonant culture and establish new, meaningful cultural routines. The challenge is to find ways to fold this dispersed knowledge into policies and laws so that it is not idiosyncratic. In 2002 we visited a peri-urban farming community near Shanghai where rural peoples from the distant Three Georges Dam had been relocated. The government had arranged for each resettled family to live nearby a host family to help them adjust socially to their new urban environment.
From the perspective of the R-D-R' model, the Chinese host-guest solution brilliantly ties a family caught in dissonance culture to a family ensconced in routine culture. We are uncertain whether cultural dissonance appears in the host culture in this arrangement.

Returning to the earlier example of Zimapán Dam, three villages along the river were combined into a single settlement located on an arid, riverless plateau (Aronsson 2002; Downing 1987; Greaves 1997; Guggenheim 1991, 1993). Potable water was piped in from 23 km away, and no water was available for irrigation. Early in the project, resettlers were permitted to rename the principal street in their new town. To the surprise of outside observers, they named it River Street. The local resettlement team reported serious conflicts over rival community claims of who had the right to live on the right bank of River Street in a position identical to their original location. A few months later, they selected the new name for their arid, hilltop community: Bella Vista del Rio (Beautiful View of the River). But the river is nowhere in sight! It made no difference. They were creating a new answer to one of their primary questions that was consistent, in some ways, with their old image. Where are we? We are living in Beautiful View of the River, on River Street.

Notes

1. Some cultures spend their spare time playing games that create new, temporary routine cultures in which people can practice tactical moves for rewards. Gaming holds a significant place in culture, enabling individuals and groups to test and improve their agility to respond to the unexpected.

2. In some instances, dissonant culture may appear because the productive base (a fishing ground, an agricultural site, a ritual area) is lost, without any physical relocation of people.

3. Three weakly articulated, scholarly discussions have focused on questions of involuntary displacement, organized on the basis of the force causing the displacement, that is, conflicts, disasters, and development. Noble efforts have been made to articulate these distinct traditions: Cernea 1990, 1996c; Hansen and Oliver-Smith 1982; Muggah 2003; Oliver-Smith 2005a; Scudder 1993; see Drabek 1986 and Turton 2006 for an inventory of disaster-related research.

4. Initially, Bank social scientists anticipated that these policies would form a demonstration effect, encouraging governments to incorporate the stronger IFI policies into their national legal frameworks. Rarely did this happen, and adherence to the international frameworks remains problematic.
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5. Evidence of noncompliance has been pervasive in the involuntary resettlement literature for decades (Cernea 2005a; Guggenheim 1994; Scudder 2005a; see Council for Social Development 2008 for examples in India). For example, Scudder (2005a:86) discovered that living conditions in his fifty-dam survey were reported improved in only three of forty-four cases and restored in another five cases. The World Bank's Inspection Panel Investigation Reports offer excellent detailed examples of compliance investigations. Recent examples are found in investigation reports on the Uganda Private Power Generation–Bujagali II Project (World Bank Inspection Panel 2008b, with resettlement compliance investigator Ted Downing); the Mumbai Urban Transportation Project in India (World Bank Inspection Panel 2005, with resettlement compliance investigators Michael Cernea and Alan Rew); and the West African Gas Pipeline Project (World Bank Inspection Panel 2008a, with resettlement compliance investigator Ted Downing), all available online at http://www.inspectionpanel.org under the tab "requests for inspection".


7. A major limitation of safeguard policies is that they are applicable only to persons who lose access to assets as a result of projects whose financiers and sponsors agree to the policies.

8. On June 23, 2005, the US Supreme Court rendered a major decision that the use of eminent domain to take private property for economic development and to displace people did not violate the public use clauses of the state and federal constitutions. The Court argued that if it generates government revenue and jobs, it is a public use. The public overwhelmingly opposed the decision, leading forty-seven states by 2007 to adopt laws to limit such takings.

9. The IFIs have not resolved the inherent conflict of interest in their rule-making processes whereby those responsible for preparing the policies and procedures also are responsible for following them. The struggle for management discretion encourages them to favor ambiguities in policy language that permit them to exercise a judgment, whereas external stakeholders focus on precise policy
language that the development bureaucracy should apply (Quarles van Ufford, Kruijt, and Downing 1988).

10. The African Development Bank's involuntary resettlement policy also recognizes the rights of vulnerable peoples and sets a broad distributional goal that displaced persons must be treated equitably and share in the benefits of projects that involve their resettlement (AfDB 2003:Section III, par. 3.1).

11. OP 4.12, par. 2, appears to list three objectives (a through c) when it actually has four. Paragraph b states that where it is not feasible to avoid resettlement, resettlement activities should be conceived and executed as sustainable development programs, providing sufficient investment resources to enable the persons displaced by the project to share in project benefits. Displaced persons should be meaningfully consulted and should have opportunities to participate in planning and implementing resettlement programs.

The second sentence should stand alone. We consider this a fourth policy objective and have so interpreted it, without World Bank Board objections, in our compliance analysis of involuntary resettlement policies for the World Bank Inspection Panel (2008a, 2008b) that reports to the World Bank Board. We hope that the next revision will correct the punctuation in the objectives, clarifying that there are four. The African Development Bank's involuntary resettlement policy, in contrast to the World Bank's, sets a policy goal that when people must be displaced, they be treated equitably and that they share in the benefits of the project (AfDB 2003:par. 3.1[9]). Instead of restoration, it sets an objective that displaced people receive resettlement assistance, preferably under the project, so that their standards of living, income earning capacity, and production levels are improved (AfDB 2003:par. 3.2[9]). The Asian Development Bank sets a lower objective, namely, to ensure that displaced people receive assistance, preferably under the project, so that they will be at least as well-off as they would have been in the absence of the project (Asian Development Bank 1995:par. 33[9]).

12. Further inquiry hinted at possible status differences between guest and host, with daughters of the resettled thought to be more likely to marry the sons of the hosts.
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